Unravelling Ambiguities: The Quest for Credible Minimum Deterrence in South Asia

Abstract

Since 1998, Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) has remained India's and Pakistan's doctrinal posture. At face value, a credible minimum means less nuclear force to ensure stable deterrence. However, the term is not as simple as it seems because there is no agreed- upon explanation of how much can be quantified as minimum and credible. The Asian nuclear triangle (India, Pakistan, and China) adds another layer ofambiguity to the concept of CMD in South Asia. Because India's minimum credible nuclear force may not be credible against conventionally advantageous China. Similarly, the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan presses the latter to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the full spectrum of threats (nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional) from India. India’s qualitative build-up, like the employment ofBallistic Missile Defence (BMD), its strategic partnership with the USA, and its doctrinal postulations, have direct implications for the stated policy of Pakistan. This research basically addresses the question: Are India and Pakistan abiding by the CMD policy? How can both sides ensure the practicability of the CMD in South Asia? The study is descriptive and analytical in nature. For this purpose, secondary sources like journal articles, books, newspaper articles, and accessible official websites and documents are utilized. The article concludes that what is considered a credible minimum today may not be credible tomorrow. Thus, the arms race will continue to be a constant feature of the South Asian nuclear environment. To abide by the CMD, India, and Pakistan need to be engaged in serious nuclear dialogue and focus on credible measures (beyond risk reduction) like the mechanism ofsome arms control regime.