Changing Dynamics of Deterrence in South Asia: Implications for Strategic Stability

Abstract

Deterrence involves increasing the cost ofaggression for the adversary, such that retaliation surpasses the perceived benefits of aggression. The nuclearisation of Pakistan and India constricted the space of conventional war; however, India’s progressive enhancement in its nuclear force posture towards a counterforce targeting strategy undermines the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent forces. The introduction of offensive military doctrines and destabilising weapons systems seek to dominate escalation and destabilise deterrence equilibrium. This research paper aims to analyse how changing force postures and doctrinal positions define the dynamics of deterrence and then explore its correlation with strategic stability. To construct it, this study emphasises the episodic crisis that characterises the transitional dynamics ofdeterrence, viewed through the lens ofstrategic stability. The study is holistic in nature; it employs a process-tracing methodology to investigate India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrinal positions, which intrinsically elucidate the dynamics of deterrence in South Asia.