EXPLORING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS AND MARITIME TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S MARITIME SECURITY

Abstract

Technology miniaturization, enhanced computing power and rapid advancements in AI and precision-guided munitions suggest that uncrewed systems are likely to evolve into Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). The rise of LAWS, coupled with the increasing influence of violent non-state actors (VNSAs), private military contractors (PMCs) and state-sponsored proxies (SSPs), presents a dangerous proposition in the maritime domain. However, research in this domain is limited, especially in countries like Pakistan. This paper addresses two central questions, i.e., how LAWS may supplement efforts of Maritime terrorists and what implications it poses for Pakistan’s maritime and national security. Employing qualitative analysis, the study draws on primary data retrieved from (but not limited to) policy/ doctrines and semi-structured interviews with maritime security experts, whereas secondary data has been sourced through open-source intelligence, scholarly books, journal articles and case studies of maritime incidents. The data is analysed using the choice theoretic model for terrorism studies, complemented by the critical maritime infrastructure model proposed by Beuger and Liebetrau. Findings reveal that anti‑state actors, despite having limitations of resources, have been able to evolve and adapt to technology far more quickly than conventional forces. Balancing plausible deniability and visibility, these actors threaten not just Pakistan’s maritime security but also undermine regional security.